The basic properties of RSA cryptosystems and some classical attacks on them are described. Derived from geometric properties of the Euler functions, the Euler function rays, a new ansatz to attack RSA cryptosystems is presented. A resulting, albeit inefficient, algorithm is given. It essentially consists of a loop with starting value determined by the Euler function ray and with step width given by a function ω e (n) being a multiple of the order ord n (e), where e denotes the public key exponent and n the RSA modulus. For n = pq and an estimate r < √ pq for the smaller prime factor p, the running time is given by T (e, n, r) = O((r − p) ln e ln n ln r). 
1. Select at random two large prime numbers p and q, p = q. (The primes might be more than 200 digits each, i.e. more than 660 bits.)
2. Compute n = pq and the Carmichael function λ (n) = lcm (p − 1, q − 1).
Select an integer d relatively prime to λ (n).
(d should be of the magnitude of n, i.e., d λ (n).)
4.
Compute e as the multiplicative inverse of d modulo λ (n), such that ed = 1 mod λ (n). This is done efficiently by the extended Euclidean algorithm.
5. Publish the pair P = (e, n) as the public key.
Keep secret the pair S = (d, n) as the private or secret key.
For this procedure, the domain of the messages is Z n . For each participant of a cryptosystem, the four-tuple (e, d, p, q) ∈ N 4 is called (individual) RSA key system. The key parameter e is also called the encryption exponent, d the decryption exponent, and n the RSA modulus. The encryption of a message m ∈ Z n associated with a public key P = (e, n) is performed by the function E : Z n → Z n , E(m) = m e mod n.
The decryption of a ciphertext c ∈ Z n associated with the private key S = (d, n) is done by the mapping D :
The procedure where Alice sends an encrypted message to Bob is schematically shown in Figure 1 . A qualitatively new possibility offered by public key systems (and being unimple- Figure 1 : Alice sends an encrypted message m to Bob, using his public RSA key P B .
mentable with symmetric key systems) is the procedure of digital signature. How an RSA cryptosystem enables Alice to digitally sign a message and how Bob can verify that it is signed by Alice is sketched in Figure 2 . As a matter of course, this verification in fact is possible only if the authenticity of Alice's public key P A is guaranteed such that Bob can assume that it is her key (and not a third person's one) which he uses. This guarantee is the job of so-called trust centers.
Figure 2: Alice sends a digitally signed message to Bob; Bob uses Alice's public key to decrypt the message and to verify this way that Alice has signed it with her private key.
The correctness of RSA, i.e., the fact that E and D define inverse functions on Z n (D • E = E • D = id Z n ) relies on the simple fact that
which is immediately proved by the corollary of Carmichael A.7, p. 18. For details see, e.g., [1, 2, 3] .
Remark 2.1
Often one finds the definition of RSA cryptosystems based on the Euler function ϕ rather than on the Carmichael function λ , cf. [3] . However, since ϕ(pq) = (p − 1)(q − 1), both function values ϕ(pq) and λ (pq) share the same divisors. Therefore, a possible key parameter d relatively prime to λ (pq) is also relatively prime to ϕ(pq), and vice versa. Only the resulting counter key e may differ. To be more precise, any possible RSA key pair of a system based on the Euler function is a possible key pair with respect to the Carmichael function, whereas the reverse is not generally true. (Proof: Since λ (n)|ϕ(n), the equality ed = 1 mod ϕ(n) implies ed = 1 mod λ (n).) Using the Euler function ϕ, the correctness of RSA is shown with the Euler theorem A.2 on p. 16, instead of the corollary of Carmichael. 
Properties of an
The (trivial) keys with e = d = 1 and with e = d = λ (pq) − 1 are always possible, and
Proof. Since ed = 1 mod λ (pq), without restriction to generality we have 0 < e, d < λ (pq). Moreover, gcd (d, λ (pq)) = gcd (e, λ (pq)) = 1, because for an arbitrary integer a with gcd (a, λ (pq)) > 1 there exists no b ∈ N such that ab = 1 mod λ (pq). Therefore, e, d ∈ Z * λ (pq) . In turn, to any a ∈ Z * λ (pq) there exists an integer b such that ab = 1 mod λ (pq), since Z * λ (pq) is a group. But the order of Z * λ (pq) is exactly ϕ(λ (pq)). It is clear that 1 · 1 = 1 mod λ (n), so e = d = 1 are always possible as key parameters. If e = d = λ (pq) − 1, we have ed = λ 2 (pq) − 2λ (pq) + 1 = 1 mod λ (pq), so e and d are always possible, too. By (47), λ (pq) is even and (by pq ≧ 6) greater than 2, so ν pq > 2. The maximum number of elements on the other hand is λ (pq) − 1.
The plot of all possible RSA key parameters (e, d) reveals general symmetries in the (e, d)-plane. First we observe that if P = (e, n), S = (d, n) is a possible RSA key pair, then trivially also
Therefore, P ′ = (e ′ , n) and S ′ = (d ′ , n) are possible RSA keys, too. To sum up, all possible RSA key parameters (e, d), plotted in the square lattice [0, λ (n) − 1] 2 ⊂ N 2 with edges ranging from 0 to λ (n) − 1, form a pattern which is symmetric to both the principal and the secondary square diagonals, see Figure 3 . Thus, the region
contains all information to generate the rest of the square lattice by reflections at the main diagonal (d ↔ e) and at the secondary diagonal (6). 
Classical RSA attacks
There are several specific methods to break an RSA cryptosystem. The initial situation for an attack is that an eavesdropper knows the public key P = (e, n) and the encrypted message c.
For details see, e.g., [1] and [2, §7].
Factorization of the RSA modulus n
If the eavesdropper succeeds in finding the factorization n = pq of n, knowing e he can easily compute d. But factorization of numbers n = pq with p, q > 10 200 (8) (hence n > 10 400 , i.e., n has length more than about 1320 bits), is difficult with current technology, if p and q differ enough, |p − q| > 10 100 .
Otherwise n can be factorized efficiently by exhaustive search of two integers n + and n − satisfying n = n 2 + − n 2 − , beginning at n + = ⌈ √ n ⌉ and n − = 0. These two integers then necessarily obey n ± = p±q 2 . It can be proved that, knowing the public key (e, n), factorizing the RSA modulus n is as difficult as finding the secret key
Factorization is the most efficient known attack on RSA. The fastest known factorization method, the number field sieve of John Pollard in 1988, yields running times for a 10 GHz computer as given in Table 1 .
Chosen-plaintext attack
The eavesdropper systematically encrypts all messages m with Bob's public key P B until he achieves the ciphertext c. message m is short.
"Pad" each message such that its size is of the magnitude of the modulus. Use "probabilistic encryption," where a given plaintext is mapped onto several ciphertexts.
(10)
Chosen-ciphertext attack
There is a similar method, the chosen-ciphertext attack, which can be applied if Bob signs a document with his private key. The eavesdropper receiving the ciphertext c and wishing to find the decryption m = c d mod n chooses a random integer s and asks Bob to digitally sign the innocent-looking messagec = s e c mod n. From his answerm =c d it is easy to recover the original message, because m =m/s mod n.
Never sign unknown documents; before signing a document, always apply a one-way hash function to it. (11)
Message iteration
Let be c i ∈ Z n be iteratively defined as
In fact, c i = m e i mod n, and c 1 = c is the ciphertext. The smallest index k with c k+1 = c 1 is the iteration exponent or period of m, cf. definition 3.3: it exactly shows (!) the original message,
Such a period k uniquely exists, it is the order of e modulo λ (n), k = ord λ (n) (e), cf. (15). Thus it divides λ (λ (n)) and ϕ(λ (n)). To avoid an efficient attack by iteration, λ (λ (n)) and the order of e with respect to λ (n) have to be large,
This condition is satisfied for so-called "doubly safe primes" p and q: A prime p is doubly safe, if both (p − 1)/2 and (p − 3)/4 are primes. For instance, 11, 23, 47, 167, 359 are doubly safe primes. A doubly safe prime p = 11 always has the form 24a − 1, or p = −1 mod 24. For two doubly safe primes p, q, we have λ (pq) = 2
2 , and therefore λ (λ (pq)) = lcm(2,
Broadcast decryption by the low-exponent attack
In general, it may be convenient to use a small public key parameter e such that the encryption of a message is easy to compute (for instance for a small chip card). However, suppose Alice sends the same message to l different participants whose public keys are P i = (e, n i ) where the n i 's are relatively prime to each other and l ≦ e; to emphasize, the public keys have the same encryption exponent e. If an eavesdropper receives the l ciphertexts c ′ i = m e mod n i , he can easily compute c ′ = c ′ i mod n 1 · · · n l by the Chinese remainder theorem. But if the product n 1 · · · n l is great enough, this is the same as c ′ = m e . This equation is invertible, viz., m = e √ c ′ , and the original message is computed. To avoid this attack, each pair of public keys P i = (e i , n i ) P j = (e j , n j ) and any broadcast message m must satisfy e i = e j or m e i , m e j > n i n j (13)
Broadcast decryption by the common modulus attack
If a plain text m is encrypted twice by the RSA system using two public keys P i = (e i , n), i = 1, 2, with a common modulus n and gcd (e 1 , e 2 ) = 1, then m can be recovered efficiently from the two ciphertexts c 1 and c 2 , each of which given by c i = m e i mod n. This is done by the following procedure.
1. Compute x 1 , x 2 satisfying x 1 e 1 + x 2 e 2 = 1 by the extended Euclidean algorithm, where the indices are chosen such that x 2 < 0.
2. Determine y satisfying 1 = yc 2 + kn by the extended Euclidean algorithm.
3. Calculate c 1
The reason is that c 1 Never send identical messages to receivers with the same modulus and relatively prime encryption exponents.
3 The Euler function ray attack 3.1 The ω-function and the order of a number modulo n Definition 3.1 Let be n ∈ N, n > 1, and Z * n the multiplicative group modulo n. Then the order ord n (m) of m ∈ Z * n is given by
Let m denote the subgroup of Z * n generated by m. E.g., 2 = {1, 2, 4} in Z 7 , and ord 7 (2) = 3. Note that ϕ(7) = λ (7) = 6. Lemma 3.2 Let be m, n ∈ N, with gcd(m, n) = 1 and m < n. Then
Proof. With Carmichael's theorem A.4 and with the Lagrange theorem [3, §33] equation (16) is deduced. Let a = ord m (n). Since m > 1, we have m a > n to obtain m = 1 mod n. This implies a > log m n. The upper limits follow from the relations (55) and (16). 
.) as in definition 3.3. Let moreover be e relatively prime to λ (n). Then the (n, e)-iteration exponent s(n, e, m) satisfies
Proof. Note that for the sequence (18) 
By (54) we have e s(n,e,m) = e mod λ (n), which implies by definition 3.3 that ord λ (n) (e) = s(n, e, m). Relation (16) yields the assertion. 
It is obvious that m ω m (n) = 1 mod n for any m, n ∈ Z, n ≧ 0 (since this is the definition of the order function). Substituting n by ω m (n) immediately yields
Here "a = b mod 0" has to be understood as a congruence in Z, i.e. as "a = b." By iteration, we obtain the cascading-ω equation
where ω (r)
Theorem 3.7 Let be d, e, n ∈ N, such that n > 1, gcd (e, n) = 1, and d · e = 1 mod λ (n). Then ω e (ω e (n)) > 0, and
Proof. First we note by (16) that ω e (n) | λ (n).
, where k ′ = kλ (n)/ω e (n).) If we had now ω e (ω e (n)) = 0, then e would divide ω e (n) and hence λ (n): But then there would be no d with de = 1 mod λ (n). Hence, ω e (ω e (n)) > 0. Moreover, by the cascading-ω equation (22) we have e ω e (ω e (n))−1 · e = 1 mod ω e (n).
Equation ( The two shoulders on which Theorem 3.7 rests are equations (25) and (26). They can be extended to analogues for the following corollary.
Corollary 3.9
Let be e, n, a, b ∈ N such that n > 1 and gcd (e, n) = 1, as well as λ (n) | ω e (aω e (n)).
Then the integerd
= e bω e (aω e (n))−1 mod aω e (n) (27) satisfiesde = 1 mod aω e (n), and for any number m ∈ Z n we have
If the integer a is such that ω e (aω e (n)) | λ (n), then the unique d < λ (n) with de = 1 mod λ (n) is related tod by d =d mod aω e (n).
Proof. Substituting n by aω e , from e ω m (n) = 1 mod n for any m ∈ Z we deduce that e bω e (aω e (n)) = 1 mod aω e (n). Especially, with (27) we havẽ d · e = e bω e (aω e (n))−1 · e = 1 mod aω e (n).
If λ (n) | ω e (aω e (n)), we have md e mod aω e (n) mod n = m 1 mod aω e (n) mod n = m 1 mod λ (n) mod n = m mod n. (Note that λ (n) enters the scene in the second last equation to fulfill the equation for all m!) In turn, if ω e (aω e (n)) | λ (n), thende = 1 mod λ (n) impliesde = 1 mod aω e (n); thus (29) follows from (30). 
Remark 3.11
Given two relatively prime integers e and n, corollary 3.9 enables us to choose an (almost) arbitrary multiple of the order ord n (e) > 0 to find an integer d being a kind of "inverse" of e: If the multiple is small enough such that it divides λ (n), our result supplies a list of values, one of which satisfies ed = 1 mod λ (n); if the multiple is also a multiple of λ (n), we can computed such thatde = 1 mod a ord n (e). In particular, by (47) and (16) the Euler function is a multiple of both λ (n) and ord n (e).
Properties of composed numbers n = pq
Let be p, q be two primes, p = q. Then n = pq is an integer composed of two primes. Among the integers n less than 50 there are 13 ones composed of two primes, n = pq, whereas less than 100 there are 30 ones, shown in the following tables. Let us now study the geometric structure of the Euler function.
Theorem 3.12 Let n = pq be a positive integer, composed of two primes p and q with p < q.
For any integer p min ∈ N satisfying p min ≦ p we then have
The inequality is strict, if p min < p, q.
Proof. We have ϕ(n) = (p − 1) n p − 1 , and ϕ(n) is a function of p:
Since g ′ (p) = −1 + n/p 2 < 0, for fixed n the function g is strictly decreasing with respect to p, as long as p < q, i.e. as n/p 2 > 1.
Geometrically, this result means that in the graph of ϕ(n) the point (n, ϕ(n)) lies above the "Euler function ray" (see Figure 4 ) 
Theorem 3.13
Let be p, q two primes p < q, e an integer with e > 1, and n = pq. Moreover define for a ∈ N the exponents δ e,n , γ e,a ∈ N by δ e,n = max{i ∈ N :
as well as
Then for any integers b, r ∈ N, r − ≦ r ≦ p or q ≦ r ≦ r + , satisfying
the Euler function value ϕ(n) can be computed by
Proof. Note first that real values for r ± always exist since the term in the square root is positive,
Solving this quadratic equation with respect to r, straightforward calculation thus shows that the inequalities for r are equivalent to the inequalities
which means that 0 ≦ ϕ(n) − (r − 1) n r − 1 ≦ δ e,n . On the other hand, b being the multiplicative inverse of e r by the modular equation in (35), we have b = e j mod n for some j ∈ N, in particular for j = ϕ(n) − r. But if j < δ e,n , we have b = e j , and j = γ e,b .
Example 3.14 Let be p = 11, q = 13, and e = 7. Then δ 7,143 = 2, and thus ∆ = 26, r ± = 13 ± √ 26. So r shall satisfy 8 ≦ r ≦ 11 or 13 ≦ r ≦ 18. For r = 8, e.g., we have The following lemma tells us the grade of "coarse graining," i.e., a step-width that a systematic and definite search for an appropriate Euler function ray factor r must use.
Lemma 3.16
Let p, q be two primes, p < q, e an integer e > 1, and n = pq. Moreover let r + and δ e,n be defined as in theorem 3.13 by equations (33) and (34). Then
Moreover,
Proof. By ∆ 2 − 4pq = (q − p) 2 + 2(p + q)δ e,pq + δ 2 e,pq we achieve for δ e,pq > 0
Analogously, by (39) we have 2(
e,pq = (q − p + 2δ e,pq ) 2 , i.e.
2 .
The algorithm
An algorithm to break an RSA cryptosystem is shown below in pseudocode. It is invoked with the public key (e, n) and the estimate r for the Euler function ray as input parameters and returns a possible private RSA key parameter d corresponding to e. If it fails, d ≦ 0 is returned. 
Complexity analysis
First we note that the running time T euclid (m, n) of Euclid's algorithm for two input integers m, n is given by
where φ is the golden ratio φ = (1 + √ 5)/2, see [5, §4.5.3 , Corollary L (p.360)]. If we consider, to simplify, the running time as the number of loops to be performed, we therefore we achieve for the running time T ω (m, n, r) of the ω-function
Since the complexity T ray (e, pq, r) of the ray Attack algorithm (with n = pq) then is given by T ray (e, pq, r) = r − p log e pq T ω (e, pq, r) + T euclid (e, ω(e, pq, r)), and since by ω(e, pq, r) < n we have T euclid (e, ω(e, pq, r)) < T euclid (e, pq), we obtain
(Note that f (r) = O(r).)
Discussion
In this article a new ansatz to attack RSA cryptosystems is described, basing on geometric properties of the Euler functions, the Euler function rays. However, a resulting algorithm turns out to be inefficient. It essentially consists of a loop with starting value determined by the Euler function ray and with step width given by a function ω e (n) being a multiple of the order ord n (e), where e denotes the public key exponent and n the RSA modulus. For n = pq and an estimate r < √ pq for the smaller prime factor p, the running time is given by T (e, n, r) = O((r − p) ln e ln n ln r).
In other words, this attack is queuing up into a long series of failed attacks on RSA. So, what is gained in the end? First, we achieved a small mathematical novelty, the Euler function rays, i.e. geometrical properties of the Euler function. To my knowledge they have never been mentioned before. Second, the ω-function has been introduced, being closely related to the order of a number but being more appropriate for practical purposes. Finally, this trial as another failure in fact is good news. It seems that e-commerce basing on RSA can go on.
A Appendix

A.1 Euler's Theorem
If n is a prime, the set of all numbers (more exactly: of all residue classes) modulo n is a field with respect to addition and multiplication, as is well known. However, if n is a composite integer, the ring of all numbers modulo n is not a field, because the cancellation of a number (more exactly: a congruence) modulo n by any divisor d of n also requires the corresponding cancellation of n, and thus carries us from the ring modulo n to another ring, namely modulo n/d. In this case, d is said to be a zero divisor of the ring, since d|n and n = n/d = 0 mod n/d. For instance, for n = 9 the congruence 15 = 6 mod 9 is cancelled by d = 3 through
However, if we avoid the zero divisors of n and consider only the those numbers (more exactly: primitive residue classes) a mod n with gcd (a, n) = 1, then all divisions by these elements can be uniquely performed. For example, by gcd (5, 12) = 1 5x = 10 mod 12 ⇐⇒ x = 2 mod 12.
These numbers actually constitute a multiplicative group of order ϕ(n):
Definition A.1 For n ∈ N, n > 1, Euler's ϕ-function or totient function assigns to n the number ϕ(n) of positive integers k < n relatively prime to n, i.e.
Z * n is the multiplicative group modulo n. For instance, the set of numbers less than 12 and relatively prime to 12 are {1, 5, 7, 11}, and thus ϕ(12) = 4. An explicit formula denotes ϕ(n) = p
if the prime factorization of n is given by n = p α 1 1 · · · p α r r . E.g., 12 = 2 2 · 3, and
For a proof see, e.g., [7, §4.1] .
A.2 The Carmichael function and Carmichael's Theorem
Euler's Theorem can be strengthened. As we will see, this will yield an efficient determination of key pairs of a RSA public key cryptosystem, much more efficient than the originally (and yet nowadays in many textbooks) proposed procedure based on Euler's Theorem. 
For n > 2, λ (n) is even (since p i − 1 as an even integer divides λ (n)); for n = 2, we have simply λ (2) = ϕ(2) = 1. Moreover, since λ (n) is the least common multiple of factors of ϕ(n), it divides the Euler totient function: 
Moreover, λ (n) is the smallest exponent with this property.
Using Carmichael's Theorem, we have a way of explicitly writing down the quotient of two residue classes a/b mod n. The formula is
i.e. b −1 = b λ (n)−1 mod n. 
For a proof see, e.g., [8, §A2] .
If the multiplicative group Z * n = {m : 1 ≦ m, gcd (m, n) = 1} decomposes into the subgroups Corollary A. 7 Let be e, m, n ∈ N, n > 1, and either n a product of distinct primes, or gcd (m, n) = 1. Then for all e ∈ N m e = m e mod λ (n) mod n.
Lemma A. 8 For n ∈ N, λ (n) ≦ n − 1.
Proof. Because λ (p) < p for every prime, λ (n) < n as the least common multiple of the Carmichael function values of the prime factors of n.
